The ‘purest’ of female intellects

Simone de Beauvoir:  iconic French intellectual, philosopher, feminist, existentialist, and writer. Beauvoir is credited with creating the ‘bible’ of the feminist movement (Kirkpatrick, 2019), Le deuxième sexe, in which she defied the margins of her era and positioned herself as equal, or even superior, to the predominantly male French intellects of the twentieth century.

Amongst many other things, Beauvoir is considered to have become more ‘purely’ an intellectual than any other woman of her era (Moi, 2010, p.1). Why? Beauvoir belonged to the first generation of European women to be educated alongside men, which manifested as an education and career in which she was constantly head-to-head with her male counterparts. Beauvoir outlines in her memoirs that it wasn’t until 1946 that she became cognitive of the weight of her female intellect in a patriarchal society. This provoked her to write Le deuxième sexe (1949), which tackled ‘every one of the problems feminists today are still working to solve’ (Moi, 2010, p.3).

Reciprocal Contribution?

Photographed above is Beauvoir with her lifelong partner and fellow intellect, Jean-Paul Satre. Beauvoir has consistently maintained that her relationship with Sartre influenced her work; with Sartre having a pivotal role in her philosophical writings.

It has been argued that their public relationship ‘makes it difficult and, perhaps unnecessary, to distinguish between their separate contributions to ethics’ (Albert, 1975, p.350).  

Beauvoir certainly does adapt a form of Sartrean existentialism in Le deuxième sexe, maintaining that ‘human existence is an ambiguous interplay between transcendence and immanence’ (Mussett, 2024). Likewise, Beauvoir’s reciprocal influence on Sartre’s thought; made evident by the perplexing transitions in his work in the 1950s, timely attributed with the publication of Le deuxième sexe; as Sartre ‘struggled to come to terms with the social and historical forces’ that Beauvoir so effectively analysed in her work (Simons, 1986, p. 167). Sartre becomes enlightened by Beauvoir’s consideration of the Other within the frames of social oppression. Where Beauvoir problematises the role of woman as man’s subordinate, attributing it to how socialization leads women to conform to a sexist society, Sartre incorporates the concept of fraternity, linking freedom with reciprocity (Simon, 1986, p.170-173). This is one among many examples of their reciprocal contribution.

Therefore, to label Beauvoir as just a Sartrean extension is, as Simons puts it, ‘an unjustified, and sexist, assumption’ (Simons, 1986, p.166).

Fig.2

En-soi & Pour-soi

In Le deuxième sexe, Beauvoir’s general thesis is ‘that man has always conceived himself as the essential, the Self, and made of woman the Other’ (McGall, 1979, p. 210). She outlines that the oppression against women is incomparable to any marginalization against race or religion, as women have never existed outside of their ‘role’ as subordinate to men.

Consequently, Beauvoir advocates for women to break free from the constraints of the en-soi; that women should no longer be confined to immanence, which reduces them to the static, nuclear-familial roles of caregiver, wife, and mother. Women should strive for the existentialist notion of pour-soi; transcendence; which is the freedom to define one’s existence.

Second Only to Sartre

The philosophical relationship between Beauvoir and Sartre is a dynamic topic which continues to stir much academic debate. With that said, it is interesting to contextualize Beauvoir’s concepts of the Other, and en-soi/pour-soi, in her own life. Beauvoir labels herself ‘second only to Sartre’ because she placed second to him in the prestigious agrégation exam. However, the ambiguous nature of the statement has opened itself to a plethora of interpretations. Many academics contend that Beauvoir was Sartre’s philosophical Other, while some argue she was an independent intellectual in her own right.

In a 1979 interview with Margaret Simons, Beauvoir addresses the seemingly convoluted relationship between Sartre and her works, stating that her personal interests lie with her novels, memoirs, and essays. She clarifies that her literary works, such as Le deuxième sexe, are influenced by her life and experiences. As for her work in philosophy, she admits: ‘I have been influenced by Sartre. Obviously, I could not have influenced him, since I do not do philosophy. I critique it’ (Beauvoir, 1979).

Beauvoir frequently asserted that she did not view herself as a philosopher, which sparks controversy for many intellectual women, such as Michèle Le Doeuff, who questions why such a prominent intellect such as Beauvoir ‘seems only too eager to abandon philosophy to Sartre’ (Le Doeuff, 2007, p.137). When we consider the significance of Le deuxième sexe to the feminist movement, Beauvoir’s perception of herself in relation to Sartre feels demeaning, conflicting with her advocation of pursuing the pour-soi.

Fig.3

Beauvoir’s Self-Gaze

Beauvoir’s autobiographies serve as a useful medium for Beauvoir’s self-perception in her relationship with Sartre. In a passage in Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, Beauvoir recounts a time in 1929, when she, aged 21, and Sartre, 24, had a long, heated debate regarding pluralist ethics, where ultimately, Beauvoir admitted defeat: ‘After so many years of arrogant solitude, it was something serious to discover that I wasn’t the One and Only, but one among many, by no means first, and suddenly uncertain of my true capacity’ (Beauvoir, 1958, p.480).

The passage is surprising when we contextualise the nature of the discourse. Somehow, Beauvoir, a promising student at the Sorbonne, constructs Sartre, who had just failed his agrégation the year before, as her intellectual superior. As Moi points out – in 1929, ‘Sartre was not yet Sartre’ (Moi, 2010, p. 18). When we consider Beauvoir’s self-perception in La force de l’âge: ‘I did not think of myself as a woman, I was me’ (Beauvoir, 1960, p. 73) – it seems baffling that Beauvoir would willingly cast Sartre’s intellectual superiority as natural; fitting the patriarchal constructs Beauvoir fought so hard to reject.

Even more so when we consider the conclusive volume of her memoirs, Tout compte fait, where Beauvoir personifies Sartre and her projet orginel as the reliable ‘old bonds’ holding her life together and giving it meaning (Beauvoir, 1978). For many feminists, this is difficult to digest. Beauvoir appears to embrace the en-soi, attributing Sartre as a figure of her life’s meaning.   

It probes the question: did Beauvoir view herself as Sartre’s philosophical Other?

Perhaps her younger self was more submissive to the patriarchal construct, but it could be conceived that as she developed as an intellectual, so did her self-gaze. In La force de l’âge, she recounts another moment in Luxembourg Gardens in 1929, when she and Sartre agree to devote themselves entirely to one another:

‘In [a] cage like space, a cat was miaowing. How had it slipped in there? It was too big to get out. Evening was coming on; a woman came up to the bench, a paper bag in her hand, and produced some scraps of meat. These she fed to the cat, stroking it tenderly the while. It was at this moment that Sartre said: “Let’s sign a two-year lease”’ (Beauvoir, 1960, p.27).

Ward considers the loaded narrative as a ‘figurative entrance into the issue of relation to others and the possibility of true reciprocity’ (Ward, 1999, pp. 36–49). The pair contrast drastically in their awareness of the other, and those around them. While Beauvoir is hyper-conscious of the cat, then the woman; Sartre, oblivious, states that they should move in together, allocating a set period for the pair’s commitment to one another without even consulting Beauvoir. Despite Beauvoir often referring to them as ‘two of a kind’, their sympathy and self-awareness contrast dramatically. Beauvoir realizes early on in her life the self-absorbed presence of man (in Sartre), his unaffectedness for the Other, and the limitations this stubbornness would pose.

For example, again in La force de l’âge, Beauvoir outlines her ability to grasp philosophers’ concepts much more easily than Sartre; she rejoices in her talent for philosophy and attributes it with her ability to shape her thought to the context of the text; a talent she notices Sartre does not possess, because of his stubbornness (Beauvoir, 1960, p.220-254).  The passage enlightens me to think that Beauvoir chose to ‘leave’ philosophy to Sartre, as she was aware of the limitations that her femaleness would present to her in the context of academic critique in a patriarchal (stubborn/male) society. Therefore, Beauvoir redirected her intellectual pursuits to literature, acknowledging her perceived ‘flaws’ to pre-empt societal critique (Moi, 2010, p.33), finding in literature a more viable path for her ambitions.

Conclusion

While Beauvoir maintained throughout her entire lifetime that her relationship with Sartre was reciprocal, many intellects will counter this statement.

However, the answer is fluid and inconclusive. Throughout their relationship, and following their deaths, the discourse regarding the dynamics of their relationship is ever-changing, with new ‘evidence’ constantly being published. One could even argue that intellects utilize Beauvoir as an en-soi to fit their narrative and use the malleable nature of their relationship to fit the bias they seek to pursue. Only Beauvoir and Sartre can know the true nature of their relationship. Nevertheless, it is captivating to explore.

Appendix :

1. Figure 1 : Beauvoir and Sartre in Beijing, 1955. Xinhua News Agency
2. Figure 2 : Simone de Beauvoir in Paris in 1949. Elliot Erwitt/Magnum
3. Figure 3: Gallimard Editions first edition covers of Memoire d’une fille rangée, La force de l’âge, & Tout compte fait

Further Reading:

1. Appignanesi, L. (2017). Did Simone de Beauvoir’s open ‘marriage’ make her happy? [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/10/gender.politicsphilosophyandsociety
2. Butler, J. (1986). Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex. Yale French Studies, [online] 72(72), pp.35–49. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2930225.
3. De Beauvoir, S. (1960). La force de l’âge. Paris: Gallimard.
4. De Beauvoir, S. (2012). Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée. Editions Gallimard.
5. De Beauvoir, S. (1949). Le deuxième sexe. New York: Editions Gallimard.
6. De Beauvoir, S. (1972). Tout compte fait. Editions Gallimard.
7. Kirkpatrick, K. (2019). Was Simone de Beauvoir as feminist as we thought? [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/aug/20/was-simone-de-beauvoir-as-feminist-as-we-thought.
8. Michèle Le Dœuff (2007). Hipparchia’s Choice. Columbia University Press.
9. Moi, T. (2010). Simone de Beauvoir: the making of an intellectual woman. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
10. Moi, T. (2023). Reciprocal Otherness. [online] The Point Magazine. Available at: https://thepointmag.com/examined-life/reciprocal-otherness/.
11. Mussett, S. (2024). Simone de Beauvoir. [online] Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://iep.utm.edu/simone-de-beauvoir/.
12. Sartre, J.P. (1980). L’être et le néant. Editions Gallimard.
13. Simons, M.A. (1986). Beauvoir and Sartre: The Philosophical Relationship. Yale French Studies, (72), p.165. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2930233.
14. Thomson, J. (2022). Philosophy of objectification: Why everything changes when someone looks at us. [online] Big Think. Available at: https://bigthink.com/thinking/the-philosophy-of-objectification/.
15. Ward, J.K. (1999). Reciprocity and Friendship in Beauvoir’s Thought. Hypatia, 14(4), pp.36–49. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1999.tb01251.x.